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Note, Interpreting the Withdrawal Clause in Arms Control
Treaties
Cindy A. Cohn*
In 1989, the United States finds itself torn between pursuing the
wishful promises of the deployment of Strategic Defense Initiative
("SDI") and fulfilling its obligation to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty (ABM Treaty)'. In 1999, the Soviet Union may decide that
heightened military tensions in the world force it to cancel further ver-
ification visits by the United States called for by the 1988 INF Treaty.2
One of the scenarios exists today, the other remains a future possibil-
ity. Both, however, may lead a nation to seek to withdraw unilaterally
from an arms control treaty. While negotiators and the world com-
munity hope that a state will never choose this option, the possibility
cannot be overlooked.
The two treaties mentioned above, as well as five others concerned
with arms control, 3 contain the same withdrawal clause: "[E]ach
Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to
withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, re-
lated to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the
supreme interests of its country," (the "Extraordinary Events
Clause"). When one seeks to interpret this language, however,
problems arise. The language of the Extraordinary Events Clause has
never been invoked nor carefully defined in international law, 4 despite
the frightening specter presented by unilateral termination of a treaty
* University of Michigan Law School, Class of 1989.
1. Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., art. V,
23 U.S.T. 3435, 3441, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 (1972) [hereinafter ABM Treaty]; see also Weinberger,
Arms Reductions and Deterrence, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 700, 707-08 (1988).
2. Treaty between the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimina-
tion of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles, December 7, 1987, 88 DEPT.
STATE BULL. 24 (Feb. 1988) [hereinafter INF Treaty].
3. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Test Ban
Treaty]; Salt H Agreement: Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto, Presented
to the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 96th Cong, 1st Sess. 37 (1979), (treaty never ratified)
[hereinafter Salt II]; Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483; T.I.A.S. 6839; 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter Non-proliferation Treaty]; Treaty on the Pro-
hibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean
Floor, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337, 955 U.N.T.S. 115 [hereinafter Seabed Treaty]; Conven-
tion on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Bio-
logical) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S.
No. 8062 [hereinafter Biological Weapons Treaty].
4. Telephone confirmation by Geoffrey Levitt, Attorney-Advisor, U.S. Department of State
(October 4, 1988).
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controlling nuclear weapons. The question of which conditions it
poses, if any, has never been answered.
One could argue that this ambiguity is necessary. This view rests
on the realization that arms control agreements are very delicate, ex-
tremely political instruments. Definitive limits on a party's ability to
invoke the Clause would be misleading as well as detrimental to future
agreements since countries do not intend to be bound strictly by them.
Additionally, the inclusion of the language could indicate that the par-
ties have accepted the principle of a peremptory right to withdraw
from these agreements flowing from national sovereignty and national
security considerations.5 All of these considerations could lead one to
conclude that the language should remain uninterpreted.
This Note, however, argues an opposing position. Although a dan-
ger to future arms control may exist, a treaty clause must be suscepti-
ble to interpretation and boundaries of use which are in harmony with
general international law principles. As Professor Schwelb has stated:
"[I]t cannot have been . . . the intention of the parties to throw the
principle of pacta sunt servanda overboard in favor of the anarchic
idea of the unfettered right of a sovereign state to free itself unilater-
ally from a treaty obligation."' 6 Although Schwelb admits that the
Clause itself is subject to "auto-interpretation" 7 by the states parties to
the treaty, he adds that "[t]he decision must nevertheless be made in
good faith."
'8
This Note explores how to find and define the conditions placed
upon treaty parties for invocation of the Extraordinary Events Clause.
First, it will examine the history of the Clause and survey its possible
interpretations. The next section suggests that viewing the Clause in
relation to the ancient customary law doctrine of rebus sic stantibus,
now codified in the Vienna Convention on Treaties as "Fundamental
Change of Circumstance," can shed light on its meaning and provide a
framework for its use. Third, this framework is applied to the current
debate concerning the ABM Treaty and the SDI. Although the Fun-
damental Change of Circumstances Doctrine is not the equivalent of
the Extraordinary Events Clause, 9 the goal is to find the issues the
Clause seems to raise, using the Doctrine as a model. Two problems
emerge from this model: identifying the common intentions of the par-
ties and analyzing the transformation of the treaty obligations due to
changes of circumstances.
5. See Schwelb, The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and International Law, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 642,
661 (1964).
6. Id. at 662.
7. Id. at 663, quoting Gross, Festschrift for Kelsen, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY 76 (Lipinsky, ed. 1953).
8. Id.
9. See Schwelb, supra note 5, at 670.
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Application of these two issues to situations involving the possible
use of the Extraordinary Events Clause can offer an objective element
to the analysis. Even with the analytical assistance of these tools, the
Clause may remain hopelessly ambiguous, and one could conclude
that parties seeking to withdraw from a treaty containing it should
rely instead on customary means of treaty termination. Conversely, it
may be that the doctrine provides some guidance. Whatever help the
Fundamental Change of Circumstances Doctrine can provide, the in-
ternational community needs some sort of clarification, through arbi-
tration, further negotiation, or even unilateral statements by treaty
parties, before any interpretation of the Clause can be relied upon.'0
I. HISTORY OF THE EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS CLAUSE
A. Test Ban Treaty
The United States and the Soviet Union first used the "Extraordi-
nary Events" language in Article IV of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nu-
clear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water (the "Test Ban Treaty").II Since then, this language has been
included in all bilateral arms agreements between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union' 2 and almost all multilateral arms treaties.' 3 Despite
this wide use, no nation has ever invoked this language' 4 or specifically
defined it parameters.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk first publicly presented the Ex-
traordinary Events Clause in 1963 during the ratification hearings for
the Test Ban Treaty before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.15
Rusk emphasized the flexibility of the Clause. He noted that under
the Clause, "the U.S. would need to answer to no authority other than
its own conscience and requirements,"' 16 should it decide to withdraw
from the Treaty. Although he had indicated that the U.S. subjective
interpretation of the Clause should control, he later conceded that
some objective boundaries did exist. In summarizing the history of the
language, Rusk noted that the negotiators had inserted the Clause in
10. Id. at 662.
11. Test Ban Treaty, supra note 3.
12. This includes the Non-proliferation Treaty, supra note 3; Salt Ii, supra note 3; and the
recent INF Treaty, supra note 2.
13. This includes the Seabed Treaty, supra note 3; Biological Weapons Treaty, supra note 3.
14. Telephone confirmation, U.S. Dept. of State, supra note 4.
15. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwa-
ter. Hearings Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. Vol. 3 (1963)
(Statement of Dean Rusk, Sec. of State) [hereinafter Rusk Testimony]. Although there is debate
currently on whether the U.S. is bound to the interpretation presented at the ratification hearings
for treaties, such testimony is at least evidence of interpretive intent. In this case, it is the only
evidence of intent since the clause has never been invoked, and the negotiating record of the Test
Ban Treaty is unavailable,
16. Id. at 18.
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response to the Soviet view "that sovereignty permits the denunciation
of a treaty in any event."1 7 The purpose was to ensure that the Soviet
Union would not withdraw from the Treaty without objective
justification:
We were not at all satisfied with that view [that sovereignty always al-
lowed withdrawal from a treaty], because we feel this gives too little re-
spect to international law and to the obligations of a treaty, so we felt
that a withdrawal clause ought to be in, which although it is flexible, and
very flexible, would make it quite clear that the purposes of the treaty,
the subject matter of the treaty, and the jeopardy to the supreme interests
of the country, would have to be involved to permit withdrawal from the
treaty, and that a country could not withdraw for simply frivolous or
unrelated matters as a matter of whim and still pretend that it is legal
within the treaty to do so.' 8
Thus, even when first introduced to the Senate, the Clause was seen to
have some objective parameters.
Soviet jurists do not support Secretary Rusk's description of the
Soviet view of international treaty law. Tunkin emphasized that states
have the duty to fulfill international treaty obligations currently in ef-
fect in good faith and in accordance with recognized principles and
norms of international law. 19 In relation to the Test Ban Treaty,
Schwelb notes:
On the contrary, they [the Soviet jurists] always stress the predominant
role international treaties play in comparison with other sources of inter-
national law . . . the Soviet Government has hardly ever publicly pro-
claimed so radical a view as that which it apparently held [according to
Rusk's testimony] in the course of the negotiations on the Moscow
Treaty [Test Ban Treaty]. 20
While Rusk may have mischaracterized the Soviet view of interna-
tional treaty law, his observation that a country cannot legally invoke
the Extraordinary Events Clause on a mere whim remains
unquestioned.
B. Further Senate Testimony About the Clause
During the ratification hearings for subsequent treaties, only brief
testimony concerning the Clause was offered. No additional interpre-
tations emerged, and witnesses consistently referred to Secretary
Rusk's original testimony.2' A typical example is Ambassador James
17. Id. at 28.
18. Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
19. G. TUNKIN, LAW AND FORCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 112 (English transla-
tion of the revised Russian text) (1985).
20. Schwelb, supra note 5, at 661.
21. See testimony concerning Nonproliferation Treaty [Part 1. Hearing on Treaty on Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations and Joint
Comm. on Atomic Energy, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); Non-Proliferation Treaty [Part 2] Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess (1969).
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F. Leonard's 22 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcom-
mittee regarding the ratification of the Seabed Treaty.23 Regarding the
Extraordinary Events Clause, Leonard merely said: "This is a clause
that has been utilized widely in other post-war arms control
treaties."
24
C. Comparison of the Test Ban and ABM Treaties
The need to find a definitive, objective interpretation of the Ex-
traordinary Events Clause has grown stronger as nations have subse-
quently included it in increasingly important strategic disarmament
treaties. An extremely flexible, subjective interpretation of the Clause,
like the "conscience and requirements" 25 of a state as first suggested
by Secretary Rusk, could allow the Extraordinary Events Clause to
become the exception that swallowed the treaty. Comparing the Test
Ban Treaty's goals and subject matter with those of the 1972 ABM
Treaty, 26 which also includes the language, reveals the need for
stronger justifications in the latter treaty.
While the elimination of nuclear testing is one of the goals of the
Test Ban Treaty, Secretary of State Rusk emphasized that "the pri-
mary interest has been.. . [concern about] the pollution of the atmos-
phere."'27 The ABM Treaty presents much more ambitious goals. In
the preamble to the treaty, the U.S. and the Soviet Union are:
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the ces-
sation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward
reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament and general and com-
plete disarmament.
Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the
strengthening of trust between States .... 28
22. Former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament-Agency and U.S. Representa-
tive to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
23. See supra note 3.
24. Seabed Arms Control Treaty: Hearing on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weap-
ons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil
Thereof Hearings on Ex.H. 92-1 Before the Senate on Foreign Relations Comm., 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 9 (1972) (Statement of James Leonard); see also memo from Charles Robinson, Deputy
Secretary of State to President Gerald R. Ford, 6/22/76, folder ND20-ICO 158, Box 73, WHCF,
Gerald R. Ford Library (inclusion of clause in unratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty and unrati-
fied Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes); Strategic Arms Limitations Agree-
ments: Hearing on Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and the Interim
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement)
Including an Associated Protocol Signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972, Before the Senate Foreign
Relations Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1972).
25. See supra note 16.
26. ABM Treaty, supra note 1.
27. Rusk testimony, supra note 15, at 55.
28. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, at 3438.
Michigan Journal of International Law
While both treaties are important, the ABM Treaty is more di-
rectly focused on stability. ABM Treaty Chief Negotiator Gerard
Smith underscored the danger of withdrawing:
Denouncing the ABM Treaty in order to permit defense of American
ICBMs would open the door to Soviet ABM deployments which would
reduce the retaliatory potential of all American strategic ballistic mis-
siles, SLBMs as well as ICBMs. Such ABM deployments would be de-
stabilizing and likely would result in higher levels of strategic forces on
both sides. We should keep the ABM Treaty even if further limitation of
offensive arms eludes us.
29
This rationale continues to support the need for the treaty. Use of the
Clause in the INF Agreement and its potential use in a START treaty
further amplify the need for a common interpretation.
D. Unilateral Termination in Other Treaties
Although many treaties explicitly provide for a method of termina-
tion outside the customary methods, few provide more than proce-
dural guidelines. The vast majority of treaty termination clauses
require only written notice. 30  Others make withdrawal contingent
upon the parties' failure to approve modifications or amendments.
3'
The Extraordinary Events Clause is narrower. It requires that a state
base its decision to withdraw on events "related to the subject matter
of this Treaty." While the precise meaning of this phrase is not clear,
and though it has never been invoked, inclusion of it indicates that
more than written notice is needed to support the unilateral termina-
tion of a treaty.
Once one concludes that the Clause requires some justification
before a state can legitimately invoke the Extraordinary Events
Clause, the problem becomes more difficult. What level of justification
would be needed? Is a new administration within a state reason
enough to invoke the Clause? Does the loss of one of the stated treaty
goals justify invocation? Can technological advances justify with-
drawal? By exploring the issues raised in a fundamental change of
circumstances analysis, one can begin to frame the possible answers to
these questions.
29. G. SMITH, DOUBLETALK: THE STORY OF THE FIRST STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
TALKS 456 (1980).
30. See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights of Feb. 22, 1926, United
States - El Salvador, art. XXVIII, 7 BEVANS 521, 46 Stat 2817, 7 Treaties and Other Int'l Agree-
ments of the U.S. 1776-1949 at 535, WHITEMAN DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 at 452
[hereinafter Whiteman]; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights of 1923, United
States - Germany, art. XXXI, 8 BEVANS 153, 44 Stat. 2132, WHITEMAN 14 at 451; Convention
Providing for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals, July 7, 1911, art. XVI, I BEVANS
804, 37 Stat 1542, WHITEMAN 14 at 449; Air Transport Services Agreement of March 27, 1946,
United States - France, 61 Stat 3445, T.I.A.S. No. 1679; 139 U.N.T.S. 114.
31. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1 1959, art. XII(c), 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402
U.N.T.S. 71.
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II. FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
Only limited interpretative information regarding the Extraordi-
nary Events Clause is available. Yet, the problem of weighing the jus-
tification for unilateral withdrawal from treaties is not new.
International law has developed the customary doctrine of rebus sic
stantibus, which can help define the issues involved in interpreting the
Clause. Now codified in article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, this doctrine focuses on the treaty parties' intentions
and the objective shift in their obligations caused by the change of
circumstances to try to define the sort of change needed to justify
withdrawal from a treaty. The doctrine echoes the considerations em-
phasized by Secretary Rusk,32 by clarifying the sorts of circumstances,
other than breach by one party, in which termination is acceptable.
The doctrine evaluates the effect of a change of circumstances on
treaty relationships by viewing the change in light of the shared inten-
tions and expectations of the parties.3 3 This approach is consistent
with the goal of stability in treaty relationships and with the principle
of pacta sunt servanda.34 The rebus sic stantibus doctrine has been
applied to treaties affected by situations ranging from the outbreak of
major wars,35 to the emergence of new states, 36 and to a radical change
in the obligations of the parties over long periods of time.3 7 Documen-
tary evidence of the past sixty years shows at least eighty cases in
which states have invoked the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, or re-
ferred to it as a binding rule of international law.
3 8
These instances, combined with the explanations of the doctrine in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 39 and the Report of the
International Law Commission, 40 have provided the international
community with a set of objective parameters within which one may
determine the proper uses of the doctrine. Although analysis of these
factors will still contain a subjective element, focus on them will lessen
the chance that a country will interpret the Extraordinary Events
Clause according to the pure subjectivity of its changing whim. One
commentator has observed:
Interpretation is an art rather than a science. A subjective element is
32. See supra note 18.
33. Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances (Rebus Sic Stantibus), 61 AM. J. INT'L L.
895, 896 (1967).
34. Id.
35. See infra note 60.
36. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
38. A. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMINATION: LAWFUL BREACHES AND RE-
TALIATIONS 123 (1975).
39. See Vienna Convention, infra note 50.
40. Gallagher, Legal Aspects of SDI, 111 MILITARY L. REV. 11 (Winter 1986).
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never absent from it. But this inevitable subjectivity is not limitless. It is
controlled in varying degrees by evidence as to the actual expectations
and objectives of the parties and the other factors that may properly be
taken into account.
4'
Accordingly, analysis of the circumstances developing around a
treaty, in light of past uses of the doctrine, can give a more objective,
predictable framework for interpreting the Extraordinary Events
Clause.
A. History
Although the origins of the doctrine are obscure, 42 by the 16th and
17th centuries a 'clausula' rebus sic stantibus was included or implied
in all treaties,43 as well as all statutes, wills, contracts, privileges, oaths
and sworn declarations of renunciation of rights.44 The theory was
still in a rudimentary stage in these times, however, and the scope of
its exact application remains unclear. 45 In the 19th Century, rebus sic
stantibus gained higher authority in international law. The generally
recognized rule was that treaties could be terminated or modified only
with the consent of the contracting parties.46 The decision to termi-
nate was subjective, flowing from the principle of absolute sovereignty
in international law. 47
During the period between World Wars I and II, however, the in-
ternational community developed a more objective interpretation of
rebus sic stantibus.48 In treaty interpretation, a commentator explains
"[t]he new theory operates on grounds that reasonable parties would
not have undertaken the obligation had they foreseen the essential
conditions that moved them to conclude the treaty would change so
fundamentally." 49 This shift also supports the need to use a set of
objective factors in interpreting a treaty withdrawal clause.
Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties5° re-
41. Lissitzyn, supra note 33, at 897.
42. Toth, The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus in Int'l Law, 19 JURID. REV. 56, 65 (1974); A.
VAMVOUKOS, TERMINATION OF TREATIES IN INT'L LAW, THE DOCTRINES OF REBUS SIC
STANTIBUS AND DESUETUDE 5 (1985).
43. A. VAMVOUKOS, supra note 42, at 10.
44. Jason de Mayno, In primam Dig. veteris part, comment. (1582), Fol. 140, 8-10, quoted in
A. VAMVOUKOS, supra note 42, at 10.
45. A. VAMVOUKOS, supra note 42, at 11; Toth, supra note 42, at 68.
46. A. VAMVOUKOS, supra note 42, at 188.
47. A. DAVID, supra note 38, at 27.
48. Toth, supra note 42, at 71-76. For adoption of the theory of objective rule see, e.g.,
Waldock, Second Report on the Law of Treaties [1963] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 36, 83, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/156 and Add. 1-3; see also TING-YOUNG HUANG, THE DOCTRINE OF REBUS SIC
STANTIBUS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (1935).
49. A. DAVID, supra note 38, at 31-2.
50. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 62, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
39/27 (1969) in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 702 (1969).
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flects the shift to an objective format.5' To stress the objective charac-
ter of the rule, the Commission decided not to use the term rebus sic
stantibus in the text and title of the article.5 2 The Commission entitled
the article "Fundamental Change of Circumstance," and defined the
situations where change of circumstances would justify withdrawal
from a treaty:
1. A Fundamental Change of Circumstances which has occurred
with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty,
and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a
ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:
a. the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential
basis of the consent of parties to be bound by the treaty; and
b. the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent
of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a
ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty:
a. if the treaty establishes a boundary; or
b. if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the
party invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or of
any other international obligation owed to any other party to the
treaty.
53
Although neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union have ratified the Vi-
enna Convention, both acknowledge its use as a codification of
custom. 54
The Soviet Union's view of the doctrine has consistently been more
restricted than that of Western voices, but they have always accepted
the need for treaty parties to react to a changing world. In 1955,
Lisovskii echoed a common fear that the doctrine would soften the
impact of treaty law when he stated: "exploiting states often make use
of the rebus sic stantibus clause in rupturing an international treaty." 55
Triska and Slusser note, however, that even the earlier Soviet writers
found that the socialist principle of respecting treaties must not be
51. For a criticism of the attempt to objectify the doctrine, see Lissitzyn, supra note 33 at
912-22.
52. Toth, supra note 42, at 167.,
53. Vienna Convention, supra note 50, at 702. A close examination of the text of article 62
reveals an important overriding observation aside from the shift to an objective standard. The
article is cast in the negative. It states that a change of circumstances does not constitute a legal
ground for withdrawal unless certain conditions have been fulfilled. This reflects the concern of
many countries that the rule would be subject to abuse if not made as restrictive as possible.
Accordingly, the application of the principle in article 62 is restricted to cases which satisfy the
two requirements of subsection (a) and (b) of paragraph one. Only a change in the circumstances
which constituted an essential basis of the parties' consent is considered in applying the rule.
54. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 387 (2d ed. 1987).
55. See J. TRISKA & R. SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAW AND POLICY OF SOVIET TREATIES
139 (1962).
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viewed as absolutely prohibiting changes under any circumstances.5 6
While the Soviet jurists have found Western proposals of the principle
to be too revolutionary,5 7 the Soviet delegate to the 1968 U.N. Vienna
Conference on the Law of Treaties spoke favorably of the fundamental
change of circumstances article.
5 8
Under the standard set by article 62, the basic requirement for
treaty termination is that a "fundamental," "substantial," "essential,"
or "radical" change in the circumstances which existed at the time of
signing of the treaty must occur to permit invocation of the doctrine.5 9
This change occurs when unforeseen conditions related to the subject
matter of the treaty undermine the common intentions of the parties,
or radically increase the burden brought by the treaty on one or more
of the parties. These abstract descriptions can be understood better in
light of some historical examples. These examples, in turn, can help
one analyze some of the possible justifications for invoking the Ex-
traordinary Events Clause.
B. Examples of Fundamental Change of Circumstances Analysis
1. Political Changes Outside the Agreement
Certain changes in the internal and external politics of a nation
have merited the invocation of the Fundamental Change of Circum-
stances Doctrine. These shifts include war or instances when former
colonies obtain statehood. The claim has not been accepted when a
state has changed governments through internal political processes,
although the Soviet Union has supported a version of a fundamental
change of circumstances argument when a country undergoes a com-
plete social revolution.
a) War
War between nations party to a treaty clearly supports a claim of
changed circumstances. The 1941 U.S. Suspension of the Load Line
Convention serves as the classic example of U.S. invocation of the re-
56. Id.
57. See R. ERICKSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE REVOLUTIONARY STATE 75 (1972).
58. Mr. Kovalev (U.S.S.R.), U.N. Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.39/ll at 374, no. 43, 44 (May 10, 1968).
59. A. VAMVOUKOS, supra note 42, at 188. David points out that the problems plaguing this
"objective" standard are that the definitions of terms are subjective, and thus direct the focus of
analysis away from the substantive merits of the disputes. He adds:
The question of what is an important change is senseless unless we attach significance to
certain goals and come to grips with the social impact of these changes on the realization of
such goals and policies. Lacking any common criteria of what is fundamental, decision
makers attach significance to certain changes through the screen of their own pursued and
perceived values. After all, the very fact that parties are in conflict about the continuous
enforcement of an agreement means that they attach degrees of importance to certain cir-
cumstances ....
A. DAVID, supra note 38, at 49.
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bus sic stantibus doctrine.60 Due to the outbreak of World War II,
President Roosevelt suspended the multilateral shipping treaty on Au-
gust 9, 1941 "for the duration of the present emergency."' 6' When the
twenty-nine nations negotiated the agreement in 1930,62 they did not
foresee World War II. The parties entered the treaty to ensure the
safety of ships on the high seas. As the Acting Attorney General Bid-
dle stated to the President in an Opinion of July 28, 1941: "[I]n short
the implicit assumption of normal peacetime international trade,
which is at the foundation of the Load Line Convention, no longer
exists."' 63 Thus, changes in circumstances brought about by unfore-
seen occurrences undermined the basic purposes of the treaty. The
wartime conditions also radically increased the extent of the treaty
obligations because the U.S. needed to ferry huge quantities of war
material overseas. 64 War would also undoubtedly merit invocation of
the Extraordinary Events Clause.
b) New Statehood
New statehood for former colonies has also been accepted as
grounds for application of the doctrine rebus sic stantibus; it serves as
an appropriate analogy for the Extraordinary Events Clause by show-
ing that changes which so drastically affect a country can destroy the
common intentions of the parties. One example of this is the nullifica-
tion of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1815 after the separation of
Brazil from Portugal in 1822.65 In this as in other cases,66 Portugese
courts recognized that the independence of the former colonies re-
sulted in both the loss of the parties' common intentions and the great
change in the extent of obligations since an entirely new government
had emerged. The changed circumstances claim in these cases, called
the "clean slate" view, now represents international custom.
67
60. Int'l Load Line Convention of July 5, 1930, 2 BEVANS 1076, 47 Stat 2228.
61. Id. 14 WHITEMAN, supra note 30, sec. 40, at 485 (1970). On December 21, 1945, Presi-
dent Truman revoked the proclamation.
62. A. VAMVOUKOS, supra note 42, at 103.
63. Quoted in 14 WHITEMAN supra note 30, at 484-85.
64. Gross, Negotiated Treaty Amendment: The Solution to the SDI-ABM Treaty Conflict, 28
HARV. INT'L L. J. 31, 51 (Wint. 1987).
65. Amin, The Theory of Changed Circumstances in International Trade, LLOYD'S MAR. &
COM. L.Q. 577, 581 (Nov. 1982).
66. See Carvalho v. Hull Blyth (Angola) Ltd., 3 All E.R. 280 (1979). In this case, a British
court refused to grant a stay of action because of the new statehood of Angola. The court said
that due to the independence of Angola from Portuguese rule, the District Court in Angola had
changed completely from the court specified in the contract as controlling litigation, thus creat-
ing a situation drastically different from that anticipated by the parties.
67. For discussion by the International Law Commission see Succession of States in Respect
of Treaties, [1974] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 157, 211, 217, 237, 239, U.N. doc. A/CN.4/275 and
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c) Internal Revolution
(1) Western Views
i) U.S. and Iraq
The U.S. has viewed internal changes in the administration of a
state, even those as drastic as revolutions, skeptically as bases for
claims of changed circumstances. These shifts would also offer weak
support for use of the Extraordinary Events Clause. An example of
the U.S. position is the 1959 Exchange of Notes with Iraq after that
country had undergone a revolution. In 1959 Iraq gave notice to ter-
minate a 1954 Military Assistance Agreement, 68 along with certain
other agreements, stating that the agreement was "no longer in har-
mony with the realities of Iraq after the Revolution of July 14, 1958,
because of the 'change of circumstances.' "69 Although the U.S. ended
the agreements, the State Department rejected the changed circum-
stances argument, saying it "cannot concur ... on the basis therein
described. ' '70 This denial stemmed from the treaty custom which
holds that internal political changes do not affect treaty validity.71
ii) Bell v. Iran
U.S. courts have recently confirmed the view expressed by the
State Department in 1954. In American Bell International v. Islamic
Republic of Iran,72 Bell argued that a service contract with the Ira-
nian government should be invalidated because of the recent revolu-
tion in Iran. The court held that since the U.S. government had
officially recognized the Islamic Republic of Iran as legal successor to
the Shah's regime, the Iranian courts should continue to use Iranian
law to adjudicate any disputes arising under the contract. 73 The con-
tract was made on July 23, 1978,74 and while the court noted the
"credible evidence that the Islamic Republic is xenophobic and anti-
Add. I and 2; A/CN.4/278 Add. 1-5; a/8710/Rev. 1, see also Waldock, Gen. Course on Int'l L.,
106 REC. DES COURS 1, 49-53 (1962-I); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 210 (1986).
68. Military Assistance Agreement, Apr. 21, 1954, United States - Iraq, 5 U.S.T. 2496;
T.I.A.S. No. 3108.
69. Id.
70. 14 Whiteman at 487.
71. "The rights, capacities and obligations of a state appertain to the state as such and are
not affected by changes in its government." L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT,
supra note 54, at 266.
72. American Bell International v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F.Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) [hereinafter Bell].
73. Amin, supra note 65, at 584.
74. Bell, supra note 72, at 421.
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American, '75 it would not invalidate the contract because of the 1979
revolution. U.S. recognition of the new Iranian government as legal
successor affirmed that insufficient change in the Iranian historical set-
ting had occurred to warrant termination of the contract obligations.
iii) US.S.R. and Iran
Changes within the internationally recognized governments of
treaty parties have never supported a claim of changed circumstances.
Professor Reisman, 76 however, has suggested that Iran could invoke
the doctrine to escape a 1921 treaty which had granted the Soviet
Union a discretionary right of military intervention in Iran should
Moscow conclude that certain interests are "menaced." An annex to
the treaty adds that preparations for a "considerable armed attack"
would justify such intervention. 77 In 1979, Iran announced abroga-
tion of the intervention part of the treaty, but did not invoke article 62.
Reisman subsequently argued that the situation would merit use of
article 62 since both Iranian and Soviet politics had changed drasti-
cally after the formation of the treaty. The Soviet Union stabilized its
internal politics and developed a stronger foreign policy in the period
between the unstable years following the Bolshevik Revolution and
1979. Reisman notes that the parties' common intentions had been
lost and that their obligations had changed. Iran no longer needed the
protection of Soviet armed military intervention, and feared Soviet
misuse of the treaty against Iran.
(2) U.S.S.R. view
i) Socialist Revolution (State Succession)
While the Soviet jurists look skeptically upon the general Funda-
mental Change of Circumstances Doctrine, 78 their view of the concept
in relation to fundamental changes in the social system is more lib-
eral. When a social revolution changes a state from one historical
form to another, as did the Revolution of 1917, a new state arises
which must be free from the treaties concluded by its predecessor.
79
In these situations, however, the Soviets would limit the types of
change which would be acceptable within the scope of the doctrine.
75. Bell, supra note 72, at 423.
76. Reisman, Termination of the USSR's Treaty Right of Intervention in Iran, 74 AM. J.
INT'L L. 144 (1980).
77. Treaty of Friendship, Feb. 26, 1921, Persia - Russian Socialist Federal Republic, 9 LNTS
384, in Reisman, supra note 76, at 145.
78. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
79. R. ERICKSON, supra note 57, at 80-81.
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At the 1966 Helsinki Meeting of the International Law Association,
Professor I. I. Lukashuk explained: "I mean, of course, not a political
coup, but such a deep revolution as changes the very foundation of the
state - its social, economic and political foundations." 80
d) Policy Shifts Short of Revolution
International custom holds that a duly elected government is
bound by its predecessor's treaties, and dictates that this domestic
change does not constitute the "fundamental" change necessary for
invocation of the doctrine.8 1 In this, the Soviet jurists agree with
Western analysts and the International Law Commission. The Com-
mission chose the name "Fundamental Change of Circumstances" for
article 62 in order to "exclude abusive attempts to terminate a treaty
on the basis merely of a change of policy."'8 2 No claims of changed
circumstances based solely on policy shifts within a state have suc-
ceeded in permitting a state to justify termination of a basic treaty
obligation.
2. Basis of Treaty Agreement Lost
a) Fisheries Jurisdiction
In 1973, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") emphasized
that all goals upon entering a treaty must be lost for a claim of "Fun-
damental Change of Circumstances" to succeed.8 3 In the Fisheries Ju-
risdiction case, Iceland sought to invalidate a 1961 Exchange of Notes
which limited Iceland's exclusive fisheries jurisdiction to a twelve-mile
zone from its shores and mandated ICJ jurisdiction for any disputes. 84
The ICJ agreed with Iceland that international law had increasingly
recognized claims of jurisdiction beyond the twelve-mile zone. The
Court stated that "it is unlikely that the new agreement would have
been made if the Government of Iceland had known how matters
would resolve."85 Despite this recognition, however, The ICJ refused
Iceland's claim of termination by changed circumstances.
The Court explained that a state's intentions upon entering a treaty
must be determined not only from the text, but also from the whole set
80. Lukashuk (U.S.S.R.), Report oftthe 52nd Conference, Helsinki 562 (1966) quoted in id. at
83.
81. Id. See also L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, supra note 54, at 507.
82. [19631 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 210, U.N. Doc. A/5509.
83. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.) 1973 I.C.J. 3, 21 [hereinafter Fisheries Juris-
diction].
84. Id. at 6-9.
85. Id. at 17-18.
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of circumstances surrounding the agreement. In its examination of
those circumstances, the Court found that the parties sought two
objectives: immediate recognition of Iceland's twelve mile jurisdiction
and the securing of a "means whereby the parties might resolve the
question of the validity of any further claims."' 86 These objectives in-
duced the parties to agree to the 1961 Exchange of Notes. Although
the ICJ agreed that the first objective may have "disappeared alto-
gether,"' 87 it explained: "this is not a ground justifying repudiation of
those parts of the agreement the object and purpose of which have
remained unchanged." '88
b) Termination of the Black Sea Agreement
The Black Sea Agreement portion of the 1856 Treaty of Paris
89
required absolute neutrality in the Black Sea between the parties to the
Agreement - Turkey, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Prussia,
France, Russia and Sardinia.90 Fourteen years after the treaty was
enacted, Russia declared her intent not to be bound. She based this
refusal on three changes in circumstances: (1) the union of Moldavia
and Wallachia by a series of revolutions; (2) the admission to the
Black Sea of foreign warships; and (3) the introduction of iron-clad
ships.91 All of these, she claimed, made it difficult to "retain the moral
validity which it [the Treaty Conventions respecting the neutrality of
the Black Sea] may have possessed at other times."'92 Russia empha-
sized that growing military tensions in the area (she was already at
war with France) had resulted in the loss of the parties' common in-
tentions. Because Russia's claim of rebus sic stantibus would have ter-
minated the treaty, all of the parties signed a new treaty in order to
maintain the agreement. 93
3. Technological Advances
The Termination of the Black Sea Agreement also exemplifies the
claim that technological advances can undermine the parties' common
intentions and increase the burden of a treaty. The introduction of
86. Id.
87. Id. at 18-19.
88. Id.
89. Treaty of 30 March 1856, art. 11, 13-14, 46 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 22
(1865).
90. Id. See also A. VAMVOUKOS, supra note 42, at 67.
91. T. YU-HAO, THE TERMINATION OF UNEQUAL TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 75
(1933).
92. Note of Prince Gortchakoff of October 19-31, 1870, quoted in T. Yu-HAO, supra note 91.
93. A. VAMVOUKOS, supra note 42, at 70.
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iron-clad ships, especially in light of the heightened tensions in that
area, was one of the factors which Russia mentioned in her denuncia-
tion. "The introduction of iron-clad vessels, unknown and unforeseen
at the conclusion of the Treaty of 1856, increased the danger for Rus-
sia in the event of war, by adding considerably to the already patent
inequality of the respective naval forces."
'94
This example is difficult to apply to modern situations. The termi-
nation occurred in 1870, when a states' subjective interpretation of the
binding force of treaty was controlling.95  It also concerns a very
politicized decision. Despite these factors, the incident is the only one
seen in the doctrine's history which specifically mentions that techno-
logical changes can affect the obligations which a treaty places on par-
ties. In the arms control context, this argument is more easily applied.
III. USING THE FRAMEWORK: THE EXAMPLE
OF THE ABM DEBATE
A. The ABM Treaty Dispute
Applying the Fundamental Change of Circumstances analysis to a
situation involving a treaty containing the Extraordinary Events
Clause highlights the usefulness of the doctrine. The present debate
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union over the application of the
ABM Treaty to the SDI provides an example of this analysis. The past
uses of the doctrine can demonstrate the types of extraordinary events
which might qualify as acceptable reasons for invoking the Clause.
This inquiry focuses on the common intentions of the parties and the
transformation of the obligations since the treaty was signed.
Although voices within the U.S. and the Soviet Union have dis-
agreed about when development and testing of SDI violates the treaty,
authorities do agree that no interpretation of the ABM Treaty would
allow either party to deploy defensive systems in space like those being
studied. 96 Under the restrictive interpretation favored by some mem-
bers of Congress, the treaty prohibits SDI when it prohibits all but
future land-based ABMs. 97 This is because the definition of ABMs
94. Correspondence respecting the Treaty of 1856, 3 MAP OF EUROPE BY TREATY 1892-95
(E. Hertslet, ed.) quoted in A. VAMVOUKOS, supra note 42, at 67.
95. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
96. See Cushman, Preliminary Tests Gain Approval in 'Star Wars', N.Y. Times, Sept. 19,
1987, at 5, col. 2; Hearings on Military Implications of the Treaty on Limitations of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms Before the
Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 287 (1972) (statement by Gerard C.
Smith); Speech by Paul H. Nitze, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International
Studies 3 (April 1, 1987).
97. Article V says "Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or
components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based." ABM Treaty,
supra note 1, art. V, para. 1.
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referred to in article V98 refers to both the current ABM components
listed as well as all those which may be developed in the future. 99 In
addition, Agreed Statement D attached to the treaty addresses the SDI
issues by prohibiting ABM systems "based on other physical princi-
ples."' ° Even if it can be shown that SDI is based on physical princi-
ples developed after 1972, it would be covered by the treaty.
In contrast, the Reagan Adminstration proposed a broad interpre-
tation which finds that Agreed Statement D reserves judgment on later
weapon systems. 01 State Department Legal Advisor Sofaer argues
that the ABM "systems" or "components" prohibited in article V are
only those listed in the definition of ABMs contained in article II(i). 102
Under either interpretation, however, the basic principle of the treaty
- that neither side may deploy systems or components without
amendment to the treaty 0 3 - has not been questioned.' °4
Work on the SDI program has now reached a phase of develop-
ment labeled "demonstration and validation."'' 0 5 Former Defense
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger said that, with an immediate start,
the first phase of a missile defense system could be put into operation
98. The definition is contained in art. II, para. 1: "For purposes of this Treaty an ABM
system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory,
currently consisting of: (a) ABM interceptor missiles ... (b) ABM launchers. . ., and (c) ABM
radars ...." ABM Treaty, supra note 1.
99. The result of this reading is two-fold. First, except in case of fixed land-based systems,
parties may only test experimental ABMs in the laboratory. Second, parties cannot give non-
ABM missiles ABM capability (to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight
trajectory) or test any missile launcher or radar "in an ABM mode."
In a recent article, Professor Chayes finds that the ABM treaty is at risk. First, he notes that
the objective of the program as defined by the President is illegal under the treaty since article I
states "[e]ach party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its
country" and that is the main objective of the SDI program as presented by President Reagan.
Second, he explains that many of the tests of Anti-Satellite Systems (ASAT) and Anti-Tactical
Ballistic Missile Systems (ATBM) are identical to those necessary for ABM development as well
as SDI. He examines the recent statements by the U.S. that it is not yet violating the treaty, and
concludes that even if the U.S. is not yet technically violating the treaty, it clearly will be in
violation of it in two to three years at most. Chayes, Dyson Distinguished Lecture. The ABM
Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative, 5 PACE L. REV. 735 (1985).
100. Agreed Statement D, ABM Treaty, supra note 1.
101. See Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1972, 1973 (1986).
102. Sofaer says that the list was not meant to extend into the future. First, the Agreed
Statement specifically allows for "creation" of technologies based on "other physical principles",
and only limits the development and deployment. He argues that this qualification wouldn't be
necessary if article V was future-encompassing.
Second, he finds that the word "currently" is meant to limit the definition of ABMs to those
available subsequently listed as available now. He supports this interpretation by saying that (1)
the rest of the treaty refers to "system" only in the present tense, never projecting it into the
future, and (2) article IV limits itself to the word "launchers," which does not allow for future
technologies. Id.
103. Art. III makes an exception for one remaining land-based system on each side. ABM
Treaty, supra note 1.
104. Nitze, supra note 96; Smith, supra note 96.
105. Cushman, Preliminary Tests Gain Approval in 'Star Wars', supra note 95, at col. 1.
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as early as 1994.106 Though many members of the Adminstration
have given ambiguous answers when questioned as to the progress of
SDI, former National Security Advisor Carlucci indicated a clear pur-
pose: "We've never made any bones about the Strategic Defense Initi-
ative. We intend to develop it as rapidly as we can and deploy it when
it is ready."' 0 7 Thus, when it deploys space-based weapons, the U.S.
will be in direct violation of the Treaty under either the broad or nar-
row interpretation of the ABM Treaty.
B. Applying the Factors to the ABM Dispute
The U.S. could support an invocation of the Extraordinary Events
Clause with three main claims of changes since the ABM Treaty was
concluded. First, the parties have experienced internal political
changes. Second, the underlying intentions of the Treaty are no longer
present. Third, the technological advances since the conclusion of the
treaty have radically changed the treaty obligations of the states. An
examination of each of these arguments will show how the analysis of
the parties' intentions, and the objective transformation of their obli-
gations since the Treaty was signed, in light of past uses of the Funda-
mental Change of Circumstances doctrine, can provide an analytical
framework in which to apply the Extraordinary Events Clause.
1) Political Changes
When one compares the examples given, the positions of the U.S.
and Soviet Union have not shifted enough to warrant withdrawal from
the treaty under article 62. The ABM treaty has functioned for only
sixteen years and neither party has been involved in a major war,
emerged as a new state, or undergone a fundamental social revolution
in the interim. As in the situation between Iran and the U.S., 08 both
states have recognized each other's successor governments. Although
both have undergone leadership changes, these have not been as exten-
sive as the changes which have been seen in the history of the doctrine.
In applying the Extraordinary Events Clause, one would evaluate
how the shifts have affected the common intentions of the parties.
Taking the declared intentions on the face of the treaty, 0 9 it is difficult
to argue that new administrations of Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush
have altered the desires to end the nuclear arms race, reduce strategic
arms or strengthen trust between nations. The continuing efforts by
their two administrations to reach strategic arms agreements such as
106. Id. at col. 3
107. Remarks made on Sept. 20, 1987 "Meet the Press," quoted in Gordon, Senate Commit-
tee Threatens Delay of New Arms Pact, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1987, at 6, col. 5.
108. Bell, supra note 72.
109. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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INF and START would argue for just the opposite." 0 Additionally,
the strong international law tradition, which precludes changes in
treaty status based on political changes, further discourages invocation
of the Extraordinary Events Clause based on political shifts within the
two countries.
2) Basis of Treaty Agreement Lost
In the ABM Treaty example, an Extraordinary Events Clause in-
vocation could be based on three claims that focus on the underlying
reasons for the agreement. The strongest would be that further negoti-
ation was a condition of the treaty. The U.S. issued a unilateral state-
ment with the treaty which emphasized the goals of further
negotiation and reduction to "achieve more complete limitations of
strategic arms."'' It warned that if an "agreement providing for
more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved
within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized,"' 2 con-
stituting a basis for withdrawal. 113
A second element would be that the strategic conditions upon
which the treaty was concluded have been materially altered.' '4 For-
mer Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger' 'I has suggested that the
ABM Treaty was based on the theory of mutual assured destruction
("MAD"), 116 and then "Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's be-
lief that the Soviet Union would be satisfied with the concept of deter-
rence based on parity once it achieved nuclear equality with the
United States."' '17 Weinberger feels that McNamara seriously mis-
judged the Soviet Union, and that this misjudgment justifies use of the
Extraordinary Events Clause: "We should be discussing opening up a
new strategic relationship and a defensive transition, not quibbling
over legalistic, hazy interpretations [of the ABM Treaty] which effec-
tively preserve the mistakes of the past and endanger our future secur-
ity."1 8 This reasoning further supports the third claim supporting
110. See Nelson, Two Leaders Stress Gains at Summit, Rights, Regional Issues Cited; Further
Arms Talks Called Vital, L.A. Times, June 2, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 5; Pond, Ronald and Mikhail:
The Summer of Their Content - And a New Detente, Christian Sci. Monitor, June 16, 1988, at
16.
111. Unilateral Statement A, ABM Treaty, supra note 1.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Weinberger, supra note 1, at 706.
115. Caspar Weinberger was Secretary of Defense from 1981 to Nov. 1987.
116. This theory set a finite limit on the number of U.S. missiles at the number needed to
ensure a devastating American retaliatory strike on the Soviet Union after any initial Soviet
attack. Its basis is a condition of mutual vulnerability. Pond, Superpower Leadership on the Line
at Summit; Soviets Yielded Most on Road to Summit, Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 7, 1987, at 1.
117. Weinberger, supra note 1, at 707.
118. Id. at 707-08; see also Pond, supra note 116, for a discussion of the demise of the MAD
theory.
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invocation of the Clause. Weinberger adds that the subsequent Soviet
expansion of their nuclear arsenal testifies to McNamara's misjudg-
ment. " 9 The argument is that the treaty was negotiated during a time
of rough strategic parity which has since been lost.
Several factors would complicate these claims, however. First,
when the five-year mark was reached in 1977, the U.S. made no effort
to withdraw from the treaty. The INF Agreement also reflects exactly
the goal stated in the U.S. unilateral statement - a subsequent agree-
ment which not only limits, but reduces the number of weapons pos-
sessed by each country. 20 In addition, the research and development
of SDI subsequent to the treaty's conclusion violates the spirit of fur-
ther limitations emphasized by the statement; it does not lead to the
invocation of the Clause. Since increased work with SDI runs counter
to the declared intentions of the treaty,' 21 the U.S. would seem spe-
cious to use its own violation to justify the invocation of the Extraordi-
nary Events Clause because a further agreement has been difficult to
achieve. The policy change from the fundamental policies underlying
the treaty, as explained by former Secretary of Defense McNamara,
would be troublesome, since these were not the sole reasons for con-
cluding the treaty.122 The general custom preventing internal political
changes from altering a state's treaty obligations would look dis-
favorably on a claim that an "extraordinary event" had occurred.
23
Additionally, as one commentator has said: "a state cannot alter a
factor entirely within its control and claim that a 'change' renders a
prior treaty obligation oppressive."'
' 24
The claim of Soviet domination in strategic nuclear devices also
presents difficulties due to the lack of accurate information. Many
commentators claim that rough parity still exists between the two na-
tions. 25 They note that the U.S. has matched Soviet efforts in offen-
sive missile capabilities by hardening ICBM silos and embarking on
two offensive programs of its own: the MX and Midgetman missile
systems. 126 Others claim that the Soviet expansion of conventional
forces has altered the obligations of the U.S. to refrain from develop-
ing systems such as SDI, since it means that the U.S. must fall behind
in the arms race.
119. See Weinberger, supra note I, at 707.
120. See supra note 2.
121. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. "The basic premises of the ABM Treaty are
that there will be less need for additional offensive weapons, the strategic balance will be more
stable, and each side will be more secure if systems designed to defend against strategic weapons
are substantially prohibited." Chayes, supra note 99, at 737.
122. See supra note I and accompanying text (intentions of the ABM Treaty).
123. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
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3) Technological Advances
A final basis for invoking the Extraordinary Events Clause would
be that the technological advances of the past sixteen years have de-
stroyed the common intentions and changed the obligations of the
treaty. This may allow for use of the Clause. The U.S. could argue
that as SDI research progresses, its obligation to refrain from de-
ploying an ABM system expands, and that the intention of the parties
did not encompass the tremendous growth of SDI technology. The
treaty would not have been signed had the parties foreseen this
growth.
Schwelb finds that the Extraordinary Events Clause is framed flexi-
bly to address exactly this situation. He says, "[I]mportant new tech-
nical developments in the fields of nuclear or conventional weapons
... would, in this writer's view, be reasons justifying withdrawal by
that party." 1
27
One problem with calling this growth an "extraordinary event,"
however, is that even though SDI has only formally existed since 1983,
many of its technologies are based on ideas and techniques which were
developed a decade or two earlier.1 2  The experiments which have
tested new missile guidance and control systems employ the same ba-
sic technologies as those in ICBM interception. 129 All were begun
prior to the treaty.
In addition, Agreed Statement D to the ABM Treaty explicitly
deals with "ABM systems based on other physical principles," foresee-
ing the directed energy principles of SDI. 130 Negotiator Nitze re-
cently related that during the treaty negotiations the Soviets
"suggested that if systems or components based on other physical
principles were created in the future we (the U.S. and Soviet Union)
should discuss the matter in the Standing Consultative Commission to
be created under Article XIII.' 13 I Though one could argue that the
parties did not foresee the exact shape or scope of these future systems,
127. Schwelb, supra note 5, at 663.
128. For example, under the Project Defender program, established in 1958, a weapon called
the Ballistic Missile Boost Interceptor (Bambi) was developed. The weapon, propelled by a
chemical rocket, would collide with a launched Soviet missile and destroy it. To improve the
chances of intercepting a missile, Bambi would release an 18-m diameter wire net studded with
steel pellets, just before the collision. In June, 1984, in the HOE test, an atmospheric, non-
nuclear infrared homing missile based on the Bambi project, destroyed a dummy warhead over
100 miles above the earth, by unfurling a fifteen foot umbrella-like impact net in the warhead's
path. B. Jasani, Current Military Activities in Space and Their Implications, (Oct. 1987 (paper
presented at McGill University, at 7-8)).
129. Id. at 8.
130. Agreed Statement D, ABM Treaty, supra note 1; see also Strategic Arms Limitation
Agreements, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 20
(1972) (statements of Secretary of State Rogers & Gerard C. Smith, Director U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency).
131. Nitze, supra note 96, at 11.
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it is quite clear that both knew that systems such as SDI would be
explored and that they chose language in an attempt to address such
explorations.
Nitze stressed that the negotiators did address the issue of with-
drawal due to creation of components like SDI. He states that the
Soviets suggested that either side could withdraw from the treaty if
they failed to achieve agreement on such components in the Standing
Consultative Commission. 32 The United States negotiators felt that
would be too extreme a remedy. Accordingly, Agreed Statement D
mandates renegotiation by the parties in response to the development
of a system based on other physical principles. 133
Finally, the parties' obligations rest on the fundamental assurance
they sought by entering the treaty. The assurance was that "the other
side was not planning an ABM system - not putting itself in a posi-
tion where it could break out, that is abrogate or withdraw from the
treaty and quickly deploy a system."'' 34 Lissitzyn, however, has noted
that "a change of circumstances may be invoked even if it was not
'unforeseen' in an absolute sense [when t]he parties may have been
aware of the possibility of the change but for various reasons failed to
provide for it expressly;" 35 the argument would be difficult to advance
in the present situation. Successful application would require claiming
that the new technology is an extraordinary event despite the fact that
it was foreseen, provided for, and runs counter to the intentions of the
treaty.
IV. CONCLUSION
Conclusions about how the Extraordinary Events Clause should be
interpreted remain ambiguous. The fact that it exists, however, can-
not be overlooked. Even if the Clause is meant to maintain flexibility,
the Fundamental Change of Circumstances analysis can help frame
the issues by focusing attention on the common intentions and trans-
formation of obligations. As Professor William Bishop noted, "Indeed,
it must be seen that the problem of change of conditions, or of obsolete
treaty obligations is merely one aspect of the broader problem of
peaceful change in international relations."'' 3 6 Use of the Clause by
the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty would probably
be inconsistent with an interpretation of the Clause which is based
upon the Fundamental Change of Circumstances analogy. The com-
mon intentions and obligations of the parties remain largely the same.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Chayes, supra note 99, at 745.
135. Lissitzyn, supra note 33, at 912.
136. Bishop, General course on International Law, 115 REc. DES COURS 361 (1965-II) (em-
phasis in original).
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The ABM Treaty analysis provides only an illustration, however.
This Note concludes that, due to the extreme importance of the trea-
ties which contain the Clause and the growing number of ambiguous
areas such as the SDI issue, 137 some parameters must be set in order to
provide essential clarification. Although some ambiguities may be de-
sirable in the interest of national security, the treaties are not fully
functional when they contain undefined language which could endan-
ger the stability they seek. Parameters could be set by unilateral state-
ments by the parties as to their interpretations of the Clause,
138
through further negotiation, or by a mutually agreed upon arbitration
proceeding. Although nowhere in the world do things stay the same,
in the volatile realm of arms control treaties the dangers of changed
circumstances are truly frightening. While the nations of the world
may not be able to ensure peace, the international community should
at least strive to ensure mutual understanding of the agreements which
are made in the hope of avoiding nuclear destruction.
137. Another possible area of disagreement would be the many pitfalls of the INF's verifica-
tion procedures.
138. Unilateral statements were included by the U.S. with the original ABM Treaty text,
supra note 1.
